Dear participants,
I welcome you to the fifteenth edition of the Asser Institute Training Programme on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
I wish to thank the organisers of the Asser Institute for their commitment to this programme.
For 59 years, Asser has made a lasting contribution to our understanding of critical global issues through research, education, and policy advice on international law.
The OPCW greatly values its collaboration with Asser on this programme.
I would also like to express my appreciation to the presenters, many of whom have travelled to be here, for their willingness to share their knowledge with you.
This programme offers early and mid-career professionals a unique opportunity to learn about one of the most pressing international challenges—weapons of mass destruction.
The threat posed by these weapons is constantly evolving as geopolitical dynamics change, and new technologies become available.
This course aims to provide future leaders in disarmament and non-proliferation with insights into the legal, scientific, and political factors shaping the current landscape of weapons of mass destruction.
Through interactions with experts and practitioners, you will gain diverse perspectives and be able to share ideas based on your own professional experiences.
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Dear participants,
In today’s world, global leadership to contain the spread of weapons of mass destruction is indispensable.
The current state of international affairs has made it increasingly challenging to create the conditions necessary to promote control of these weapons.
The ongoing conflict in Ukraine, now approaching the third year, continues to raise concerns about the use and threat of use of chemical and nuclear weapons.
Meanwhile, the ongoing conflict in Gaza and tensions in the broader Middle East are generating fear about proliferation in a region already affected by chemical weapons use.
At the same time, the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture is eroding, with key treaties and instruments either under strain, suspended, or terminated.
In the nuclear field, for example, some States have alluded to the possibility of resuming nuclear testing, placing renewed urgency on bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty into force.
Against the backdrop of a degraded security situation, rapid advancements in science and technology threaten to introduce a new generation of weapons of mass destruction that are easier to access and use.
With lower thresholds for development and production, the number of potential actors multiply.
Despite these challenges, there have been positive steps forward.
In 2021, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons entered into force, marking a significant development in our efforts to outlaw this devastating armament.
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Dear participants,
It is in this context that the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is operating.
Established 27 years ago, the OPCW oversees the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
This disarmament treaty is unique, since it embodies a total and verifiable ban on chemical weapons.
It strives not just for non-proliferation but for their complete elimination, with zero tolerance for their production and use.
This goal is supported by 193 States, making it the most widely supported disarmament treaty in the world.
The Convention and the OPCW have delivered concrete and lasting results in the global effort to rid the world of weapons of mass destruction.
In July last year, the Organisation reached a historic milestone, verifying the complete destruction of all declared chemical weapons stockpiles.
This was a significant achievement for global disarmament – the eradication of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction.
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Dear participants,
Now that we have passed this milestone and entered the so-called post-stockpile destruction era, our focus has deepened on preventing re-emergence.
First, we must ensure that the international norm against chemical weapons use remains robust.
This means addressing instances of use of these weapons, such as those documented in the Syrian Arab Republic.
In Syria, the OPCW has been actively engaged for 11 years, yet we have not been able to close this chapter.
Investigations into chemical weapons use in Syria continue to this day through the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission and Investigation and Identification Team.
At the same time, our Declaration Assessment Team continues to engage with relevant authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic on gaps, inconsistencies, and discrepancies identified by the Secretariat in the initial declaration, made by Syria in 2013, of its chemical weapons programme.
With respect to the ongoing war in Ukraine, numerous allegations have been made by both sides of chemical weapons use, including the use of riot control agents as a method of warfare. Such use is prohibited by the Convention.
The OPCW, upon Ukraine’s request, has been delivering support in the field of assistance and protection.
Specifically, we have arranged courses in emergency response to incidents involving toxic chemicals and provided protective and detection equipment as well as training on using this equipment.
To reinforce the norm against chemical weapons, it is also crucial to ensure that all States are bound by the same obligations.
In this regard, the push for achieving universality of the Convention remains a critical priority.
Efforts are ongoing to encourage the few remaining States not Party to join.
We must—and indeed the OPCW does—continue to urge Egypt, Israel, South Sudan, and North Korea to join the Convention at the earliest moment.
We remain hopeful, that we will soon be able to welcome South Sudan as our 194th State Party.
Expanding the reach of the Convention to all States is essential, but ensuring that all States Parties are giving full effect to it at the national level is equally critical.
Effective national implementation requires comprehensive domestic legislation.
Without it, judges, police, custom officers, and regulators cannot effectively monitor the chemical industry or enforce compliance.
National legislation serves as the first line of defence against the re-emergence of chemical weapons.
Currently, 65 States Parties have yet to enact comprehensive implementing laws.
We continue to support these States Parties in building their capacity to develop and enforce such legislation, thereby strengthening the Convention’s overall impact.
It is not only the actions of States that require our vigilant attention.
It is also necessary for us to monitor the risk posed by non-State actors, especially terrorist groups.
This is not a new issue for the Organisation — States Parties have been discussing this through the Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism since 2002.
And the recent use of chemical weapons by the terrorist group ISIL in Syria and Iraq underlines the ever-present nature of this threat.
To address chemical terrorism, the OPCW collaborates with Member States to enhance national capacities to prevent the diversion of toxic chemicals and respond to emergencies.
Additionally, the OPCW works with other international entities, notably as part of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, to provide coordinated support against terrorist threats.
Terrorism is further complicated by another trend that I mentioned earlier – the current incredible advancement of science and technology.
The impact of emerging technologies and their potential application in terrorism is no longer a matter of theoretical danger but rather a worrying fact.
For instance, at the end of last year we learnt of a British man who was arrested for attempting to build a drone for ISIL, using a 3D printer. His intention was to deliver a bomb or chemical weapon.
In his apartment the police also found research material on chemical warfare agents.
This incident demonstrates how technology is racing ahead and posing new proliferation risks.
These risks also extend to the ever-expanding chemical industry, which is growing in technological sophistication and production capacity, offering new avenues for the diversion of toxic chemicals, knowledge and material.
Monitoring new developments in technology that may affect the implementation of the Convention is a challenge we are increasingly focussing on.
The OPCW’s response to the rise of artificial intelligence is a case in point.
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Dear participants,
Artificial intelligence represents a dual-use, cross-cutting issue that all involved in the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction are grappling with.
The OPCW has taken a proactive approach to tackling the implications of artificial intelligence on chemical weapons control.
It recognises both the potential risks of the misuse of artificial intelligence and its value as a tool to enhance our work.
For example, artificial intelligence is accelerating the discovery and design of chemicals for pharmaceutical use.
However, this same technology could also be exploited to develop chemicals with specific weapons applications, such as increased toxicity.
The Scientific Advisory Board, the OPCW’s principal scientific organ, has kept a close watch on advancements in artificial intelligence through hosting workshops and expert meetings to understand the current and future consequences for the Convention.
In April this year, the Director-General hosted a meeting of external experts at the OPCW, including at the Centre of Chemistry and Technology, to discuss specific aspects of artificial intelligence of interest to the Organisation.
In addition, next month, in cooperation with the Kingdom of Morocco, we will hold a Global Conference on the implications of artificial intelligence on the Convention, to address the evolving risks with a focus on chemical security and disarmament.
This Conference gives us a chance to explore how it can enhance the operational capabilities of the OPCW and maintain robust preventive measures against chemical weapons proliferation.
Even though we must remain vigilant about the risks posed by emerging technologies, it is important that we approach this issue in a balanced manner.
At this point, in the chemistry field, artificial intelligence cannot yet replace the experience and skill, of trained chemists and chemical engineers.
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Dear Participants,
To deal with the challenges posed by advances in science and technology, the OPCW has initiated a process of adaptation to ensure we can continue to deliver on our mandates.
Central to this effort is the Organisation’s Centre for Chemistry and Technology, which you will be visiting this Thursday.
This new facility, which was inaugurated in May last year, in the presence of His Majesty King Willem-Alexander of the Netherlands, is a vital upgrade for the OPCW’s research, operational, analytical, and capacity-building capabilities.
Since its launch, the Secretariat has used its state-of-the-art equipment and facilities to deliver a range of activities, including training for inspectors, laboratory exercises, scientific research, and international cooperation events.
In essence, it will assist the OPCW to remain an agile, capable, and responsive organisation operating across the full spectrum of chemical security issues now and in the future.
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Dear participants,
You are undertaking this course during a turbulent time when reaching consensus on crucial global issues is difficult.
The ongoing general debate at the United Nations General Assembly, which is concluding in New York today, is a stark reminder of the deep divisions, including those related to disarmament and non-proliferation.
Nonetheless, the Convention and the work of the OPCW demonstrates what we can accomplish when we come together to uphold a norm that serves the collective good of the international community.
In the coming days, I therefore encourage you to think creatively about how to tackle challenges relating to weapons of mass destruction.
Engage in dialogue with your presenters and fellow participants.
Consider how we can use emerging scientific and technological developments to our advantage and not our detriment.
And perhaps most importantly, reflect on how we can strengthen existing disarmament and non-proliferation instruments and revitalise an arms control structure that is currently under enormous strain.
I wish you an insightful, inspirational and productive course at the Asser Institute this week.
Thank you for your kind attention.
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