Dr Paul Hollinshead, Chief Executive of Porton Down,
Distinguished participants,
It is a pleasure to be addressing you all again at the start of this meeting on chemical weapons demilitarisation. I must extend my gratitude to the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory of the United Kingdom for its efforts in organising this annual event.
For 26 years, this conference has been a permanent fixture on the calendar of chemical disarmament experts and policy-makers from around the world. It has brought together, the foremost authorities on chemical weapons, to exchange information, and share experiences on progress towards their elimination.
Along the way, we have celebrated successes, and discussed challenges, in our collective endeavour to get rid of these vicious arms. Last July, we marked a historic moment in this undertaking – the completion of the destruction of all declared chemical arsenals.
Yet, our work to attain a world free of chemical weapons continues. With numerous existing and emerging challenges to the Convention, preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons will necessitate sustained efforts long into the future. The OPCW is fully aware of the difficult tasks ahead, as well as the existing ones, that continue to require our attention.
Distinguished participants,
The destruction of declared stockpiles came to an end in the afternoon of 7 July last year. This day the last M55 sarin-filled rocket was processed at the Blue Grass destruction facility in Kentucky, in the United States. This was a moment of great significance for the OPCW, the international community, and global peace and security in general, as it marked the elimination of an entire category of declared weapons of mass destruction.
The achievements of chemical demilitarisation since the entry into force of the Convention have been extraordinary. In total, 72,304 metric tonnes of chemical warfare agents declared by eight States Parties, have been destroyed since 1997. Of that number, the immense majority, 70,493 metric tonnes, were Category 1 chemical weapons. As you know, Category 1 includes the weapons with the most dangerous chemicals and the components and parts of these weapons. The rest, 1,811 metric tonnes were Category 2, that are less lethal weapons.
Furthermore, 97 chemical weapons production facilities, in 14 States Parties, were declared to the OPCW. 74 of those sites were verifiably destroyed and 23 were converted for peaceful purposes, seven of which remain under OPCW monitoring.
The process of destroying chemical agents turned out much more difficult and costly than expected to ensure the protection of people and the environment. Chemical demilitarisation took place under strict international verification by the Secretariat of the Organisation. We have has conducted 2,053 inspections, at 46 destruction facilities across the globe, which equates to 236,150 inspector days. To give you an idea with a simple figure of the huge task performed, all inspections carried out are equivalent to the task of one inspector, working without interruption for about 647 years.
Distinguished participants,
A few years ago, some presumed that with the end of the destruction of declared stockpiles, the OPCW would no longer be needed, and that we would simply switch off the lights, and lock the doors of the Secretariat. Events have proven that the work of the Organisation is far from over.
It is an imperative, that the OPCW preserves its traditional chemical demilitarisation knowledge. The work on stockpile destruction is over, but operations to eliminate old and abandoned chemical weapons continue. The activities of China and Japan to excavate, remove, and destroy the chemical weapons abandoned by Japan on Chinese territory are ongoing. To date, a total of 88,155 of the 115,520 declared items of ACWs have been reported as destroyed. But the task is far from over.
Additionally, universality bears an existential significance for the Convention. Efforts of the international community, to fully ban chemical weapons, won’t be complete, if the ban does not apply to all States in the world. Four States are not yet members of the Convention. That’s why, in the future, we may have to address a new possessor State joining the Convention, under circumstances we cannot foresee today, and we have to be ready for the task of destruction of its possible stockpile.
In October last year, in Algeria, I met with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Sudan, and signed a joint communiqué on his country’s accession. Given our recent enhanced engagement with South Sudan, we hope that the country will soon become the 194th State Party to the Convention.
At the same time, we must continue to confront concerns over the use and threat of use of chemical weapons. To this end, persistent challenges, such as the ongoing situation with the Syrian chemical weapons dossier, must be addressed. This remains a critical concern for the Organisation and the international community.
The OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) has maintained its efforts to ensure that all Syrian declaration obligations are met. Despite its more than 10 years of work and 26 deployments, the initial declaration of Syria is still incomplete, with 17 substantive outstanding issues.
For its part, the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria (FFM) continues its work on allegations that have been assessed as credible. At the moment, the FFM is looking into different allegations covering 15 incidents.
Additionally, in February this year, the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), in charge of identifying the perpetrators, issued its fourth report on its sixth incident investigated. The report concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that units of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant were the perpetrators of a chemical attack in September 2015, in Marea, Syria.
I should also highlight that the Conference of the States Parties, last November, adopted a decision Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use. This decision recommends that States Parties take collective measures regarding the continued possession and use of chemical weapons by Syria. It also requests the Secretariat to preserve and develop its knowledge and expertise to investigate allegations of chemical weapons use.
In addition, the Secretariat has been monitoring the situation on the territory of Ukraine since the start of the war in February 2022. The OPCW continues to provide support to Ukraine, upon its request, in the field of assistance and protection, under Article X of the Convention. The Secretariat has been delivering assistance to Ukrainian first responders, by launching training courses on emergency response and acquiring protective, detection, and identification equipment.
Both the Russian Federation and Ukraine have accused one another and have reported to the Organisation allegations of use of chemical weapons. The information provided so far by both sides, together with the information directly collected by the Secretariat, is insufficient to give credibility to these allegations.
Recently, at the beginning of this month, the United States of America adopted sanctions against entities and individuals of the Russian Federation. Beyond that the USA has made a determination that Russia has used toxic chemicals as weapons, as a not isolated incident in violation of the chemical weapons convention. To take action and to initiate any sort of activities, including an investigation, the Secretariat of the Organisation needs to be formally seized. This has not yet happened.
I recall that the destruction of all declared chemical weapons stockpiles, does not mean, that chemical weapons do not exist anymore. Under the Convention, any toxic chemicals, used for their toxic properties to cause harm or death, are considered as chemical weapons. Additionally, States Parties have the obligation to declare all of their riot control agents. It is a breach of the Convention, to use riot control agents at war on the battlefield.
Dear participants,
The OPCW must also adapt to the rapid advancements in science and technology. The spectacular progress we have all witnessed in this area, poses both, opportunities and risks, for the Convention’s implementation.
The convergence of diverse scientific disciplines and technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI), 3D printing, drones technology, automation, quantum computers, exemplifies this dual nature. AI can enhance the efficiency, speed, and safety of chemical processes, through laboratory robots and predictive capabilities. It can pose a threat, by identifying new chemical warfare agents, novel chemical pathways to existing chemical warfare agents, and novel methods of production, thereby challenging the Convention’s verification regime. We are engaging with science and technology experts to grasp the current and future impacts of AI on the Convention’s enforcement.
In keeping pace with science, our new Centre for Chemistry and Technology has already demonstrated its value. The Centre has been operational for exactly a year now, since its inauguration, in the presence of the King of the Netherlands in May last year, and we have already conducted a wide range of activities there. These cover inspectorate training, laboratory exercises, scientific research, proficiency testing, and international cooperation activities, to name a few. The Centre also bolsters the Secretariat’s ability to stay abreast of technological developments, through training, research, and access to the most modern equipment.
Dear participants,
The founders of the Chemical Weapons Convention envisioned the OPCW’s primary mission as overseeing the elimination of Cold-War era chemical weapons stockpiles. That objective has now been realised, thanks to the efforts of several generations of diplomats and experts, who have worked since 1997. The world we face today is very different to the one of the 1990s, when the Convention entered into force. In this post-destruction era, it will be essential for us to continue to adapt to prevent the re-emergence of these kinds of weapons.
We should embrace scientific and technological advances, as opportunities to strengthen our ongoing preventive efforts. This Conference provides an excellent opportunity to assess chemical disarmament in today’s world and to explore how we can all ensure that science and technology do not outpace our Convention. I wish you a productive conference and look forward to hearing about its outcomes.
Thank you.