As delivered on 19 September 2023, The Hague, Netherlands
Distinguished Fellows,
Ladies and gentlemen,
I would like to welcome you all to the Headquarters of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
We are pleased that the OPCW is once again one of this year’s destinations for the UN Disarmament Fellowship Programme. I wish to express our appreciation to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs for their collaboration with the Organisation to arrange this visit.
I would also like to emphasise how encouraging it is to see such a diverse group of young diplomats taking part in this year’s programme. When it comes to disarmament and arms control, the world needs capable and dedicated diplomats who are well-versed in the subject matter. It is critical that you have the knowledge and understanding of the broad spectrum of issues in this field to lead and push forward global discussions on disarmament. Such leadership is needed now more than ever.
The international disarmament and arms control architecture is currently under unprecedented strain. Tension between the major powers is high, while trust and transparency among them is low. Dangerous threats of the use of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, are causing immense concern. Furthermore, new technologies are being repurposed to bolster strategic advantage, testing the globe’s ability to curb their proliferation.
Against this backdrop, many key arms control agreements have been terminated, weakened, or ignored. As such, the world is faced with an increasingly complex security landscape, where consensus on how to address the most lethal weapons has become very difficult to attain.
Dear Fellows,
The OPCW is not immune to the effects of the current challenging security environment. Nonetheless, the Organisation has been diligently carrying out its mission to permanently eliminate chemical weapons and promote the peaceful uses of chemistry.
In this regard, over its 26-year history the OPCW has achieved significant success overseeing the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Today, with 193 States Parties the Convention is near-universal, which represents 98% of the world’s population.
Confidence in compliance with the objectives of the Convention is built upon one of the most extensive verification systems in disarmament. To ensure industrial activities are exclusively for non-prohibited purposes, the OPCW has carried out over 4,400 inspections in more than 80 Member States. Our inspectors have also verified the destruction of some 72,000 metric tonnes of chemical weapon stockpiles.
In fact, this year the Organisation hit one of its most critical stockpile destruction milestones. On 7 July, the OPCW verified that the last possessor State Party, the United States, had irreversibly destroyed its last chemical munition. This was a landmark accomplishment for the international community and a historic moment for the OPCW.
To promote the peaceful uses of chemistry around the world the Organisation has worked closely with Member States to facilitate the exchange of scientific and technological information. We have established a wide range of programmes that have trained thousands of scientists and other experts over the years in such areas as industrial best practices and laboratory skills. In addition, we have also provided assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons through our support to first responders.
These achievements of the OPCW have made a tangible contribution to global security and their impact has been acknowledged by the international community. In 2013 the Organisation was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its extensive efforts to eliminate chemical weapons.
Our experience underscores that multilateralism remains an effective framework for addressing serious security issues.
Dear Fellows,
Despite our solid record of success, we are acutely aware that a number of challenges lie ahead. As we intensify our focus on preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons these challenges have become ever more salient.
Achieving full universality of the Convention is one such challenge. At present only Egypt, Israel, North Korea, and South Sudan have yet to join. But as long as there is the possibility that chemical weapons exist in any country, they will persist as a credible threat.
In fact, the dangers and consequences of their re-emergence has been clearly demonstrated in recent years. The use of chemical warfare agents in Iraq, Malaysia, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and Syria has been a source great alarm. It is especially worrying that ten years after the OPCW began its work in Syria, many outstanding issues related to its chemical weapons programme remain unresolved.
We must accordingly take stock of what progress has been made and consider how best to collectively tackle these matters going forward.
Preventing re-emergence of chemical weapons also necessitates the OPCW to focus on the threat posed by non-State actors – chemical terrorism. This is not a theoretical risk but rather an evident danger – it has been well-document that the terror group ISIL conducted chemical attacks in Iraq and Syria.
Countering such acts of terror is a formidable task that involves many different stakeholders and domains and demands a multi-disciplinary approach. The OPCW therefore engages with its Member States, the chemical industry, the scientific community, and other international bodies to effectively tackle the risks of toxic chemicals being diverted for hostile purposes.
Another challenge for the Organisation is the rapid pace of advances in science and technology. New technologies such as artificial intelligence, 3D printing, and drones carry enormous benefit for societies, and could also benefit international arms control and verification. However, the potential damage that their misuse could cause is also enormous.
Accordingly, the OPCW is conscious of the need to keep abreast of the possible hazards of dual-use technologies and research. In this task, we are supported by our Scientific Advisory Board, whose experts monitor science for developments that could impact the Convention’s implementation.
We cannot, of course, hope to control every new chemical or scientific breakthrough – nor should we attempt to do so. It is imperative therefore that we strike a balance between prevention and the promotion of responsible science. To this end, we are working to strengthen our position as a platform for expert dialogue, exchange, and collaboration in the chemical sciences.
Our new Centre for Chemistry and Technology, which you will visit tomorrow, will play a crucial role in this effort. The Centre, which was launched in May, is designed to enhance the scientific and operational capabilities of the OPCW, which are critical to its mission of safeguarding the Convention and will be a hub for knowledge sharing. It will also bolster capacity building for our member states through enhanced integration of our training programmes and related activities.
Dear Fellows,
I want to conclude by emphasising that OPCW has been a well-recognised success story in the field of disarmament. But this story is far from over, since the work of preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons is an open-ended agenda. To make our chemical disarmament gains permanent, we need to invest in practical ways to stop future proliferation, as well as to develop, and realise, a more holistic approach to global chemical security.
I hope today that your engagement with the OPCW will give you a clearer picture of how we are working safeguard these gains and to meet the existing and future challenges to the Convention. I encourage you to take advantage of your visit to interact with our experts to fully understand the various aspects of our work.
Thank you.