Mr Chairman of the Commission on Hemispheric Security, Permanent Representatives, Distinguished Delegates
It is a great pleasure to be addressing this Committee on Hemispheric Security in the Organisation of American States. This forum, set up by the General Assembly of the OAS, has in a broad sense become an essential point of reference in the themes of security in the Americas. Since 1991, the OAS has done significant work in the development of confidence-building measures at regional level, including the development of Conventions in matters related to arms acquisitions and the prohibition of illicit trafficking in arms. This body gives the inter-American system a useful and effective tool for addressing the challenges of security.
The Commission has done me the honour of inviting me to this session to talk about matters connected to the struggle against weapons of mass destruction from the particular point of view of chemical weapons. I should like to express my gratitude, then, for this opportunity to share with you some thoughts on the topic, which, I trust, you will find to be of interest. If you will allow me, I will also refer to certain matters which have to do in a more general manner with the Chemical Weapons Convention, implementation thereof and promoting it in the Americas, and possible fields of cooperation between the OAS and the OPCW.
The OPCW: what it is and what it does:
As you know, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is a very young Organisation. It owes its existence to the conclusion in 1992 of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which was negotiated over a period of years within the framework of the Disarmament Conference and multilateral organs which preceded.
The countries of the Americas took an active part in those negotiations, in some cases playing a prominent and decisive role.
After the Convention came into force on 29 April 1997, the Technical Secretariat was set up in the Hague, in the Kingdom of The Netherlands, in accordance with the Convention, as the technical body charged with implementing the same.
The OPCW, which I have had the honour of leading since July 2002, is today an international technical body, highly specialised, charged mainly with the verification of the destruction of chemical weapons in those countries which have voluntarily declared that they possess arsenals, and also with the systematic and regular inspection of the chemical industry throughout the world, following a well balanced inspection mechanism which covers those facilities which are relevant for the objectives of the Convention in all continents.
In addition to the verification of the destruction of chemical arsenals and monitoring of non-proliferation of this kind of weapon by means of industrial verification, the OPCW promotes international cooperation in the peaceful uses of chemistry and assistance and protection against the use or threatened use of chemical weapons for those countries which are members of the Treaty.
The destruction of existing arsenals is proceeding in five state possessors: the United States, the Russian Federation, India, another State Party and Albania, which declared a small arsenal last year, and, of course, in Libya which joined the Convention in January.
The United States, a member of the OAS, is fulfilling its commitment in an exemplary manner. Approximately 30% of its chemical arsenals have been irreversibly destroyed under the strict regime of OPCW inspections. New destruction facilities will be incorporated into the network actually operating this year, with a view to achieving the final objective established by the Convention of completely destroying all chemical weapons in 2012 at the latest. The destruction campaign in this country demands considerable effort and over 20,000 million US dollars have been devoted thereto. This gives an idea of the magnitude and complexity of the task and of the effective political will of the United States to fulfil the obligations established by the Convention.
The Russian Federation has the largest arsenal estimated at some 40,000 tonnes of chemical warfare agents.
The process in this country has taken more time than was hoped, and has in consequence suffered considerable delays. However, Russia has latterly demonstrated an indubitable will to overcome these difficulties and the campaign destruction has at last got under way, after the inauguration of the Gorny Destruction Facility in Saratovskaya oblast. In view of the size of its arsenals, Russia will have to build new destruction facilities and for this purpose is receiving active support from the international community, notably through the recognised initiative “10 + 10 in 10”, adopted by the group of eight industrialised countries in Kananaskis Canada, under which the United States and the European Union undertook to contribute 10,000 million US dollars each over a period of ten years, this sum to fund the destruction of weapons of mass destruction, facilities and related equipment in Russia.
These contributions by the international community bear witness to the high priority attached to the destruction of these arsenals in Russia. The OPCW plays a central role in giving technical and impartial certification that Russia is fulfilling the obligations assumed by Moscow when joining the Chemical Weapons Convention.
India has scrupulously complied with the deadlines and dates established and has at present destroyed more than 45% of its chemical weapons.
As mentioned, Albania has declared a small arsenal and, with the assistance of interested States Parties, will shortly launch its destruction campaign, but, given the small size of the arsenal, we do not believe that this will take very long to complete.
Finally the case Libya deserves special mention. That country, on 19 December last, announced that it had been for years attempting the development, construction and stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction, including of course chemical weapons. In a very short time Libya, with technical assistance from OPCW experts, joined the Convention and submitted an initial declaration in which it confirmed the existence of these arsenals, of facilities for producing and stockpiling these weapons, and of the possession of key precursors for the development of this kind of weapon. In the first stage of its campaign, Libya completed the destruction of more than 3,000 aerial bombs specially designed to deliver chemicals. This was completed under the supervision of OPCW inspectors.
In emphasising this important gesture by Libya and the undoubted contribution which it has made to consolidating peace and security both internationally and in the Middle East, I should also like to underline the contribution which the United States – a member of the OAS – made to the welcome decision by Libya, having worked closely with the authorities of that country to facilitate its final adhesion to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
As regards verification of the chemical industry, the OPCW conducts inspections at facilities chosen at random from a total of more than 4,000 plant sites situated in the Member States which possess a relevant chemical industry, in accordance with objective parameters.
Although this effort is important and the OPCW Inspectorate fulfils its duties with the greatest of zeal, it must nonetheless be recognised that in the matter of non-proliferation there is still a very long way to go. It can hardly be said that, at the current rate of 60 inspections a year of facilities producing organic chemicals, the OPCW inspections are as effective a deterrent as might be hoped.
Much more can and must be done, and for that reason we are working with the members of the Organisation towards that objective.
The OPCW and the Americas
As at this month of April 2004, 162 Member States of the international community are members of the Convention, including 25 of the 33 countries which make up the group of Latin American and Caribbean States (GRULAC). The American states which recently adhered are Belize on 31 December 2003 and Guatemala on 14 March 2003.
As these figures show, the Chemical Weapons Convention has made important progress towards universality.
Only 32 countries of the international community remain outside the scope of the Convention, of which 8 belong to Latin American and the Caribbean. They are all members of the Organisation of American States.
All the States of both Western and Eastern Europe are members of the Convention. More than two thirds of African countries have also signed it, notable progress having been made recently with the entry of Libya, Chad, Rwanda and the eminent entry of Madagascar. In Asia, the great majority of States are members, with exceptions like North Korea. The great majority of Arab States have also joined the Chemical Weapons Prohibition regime with the exception of countries like Egypt, Syria and the Lebanon, in which considerations of a different character are affecting their adhesion. Israel has signed the Convention but not yet ratified it.
Among the countries of the OAS, Honduras has not yet adhered to the Convention, and Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, and Saint Kitts and Nevis have still to do so.
Our region, Mr Chairman, esteemed colleagues, has always been characterised by its pioneering spirit in all efforts aimed at providing the world with greater security and fewer armaments. This is the very region which as early as in the 60’s, outstripped the universal instruments to establish, by virtue of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the first nuclear weapons free zone, which is the only one in force today in a densely populated area.
On our continent and among the members of the OAS there exists a shared conviction and a common vision regarding security.
That is why I trust that the countries of the OAS which are not yet members of the OPCW will soon join this instrument which they are already supporting by virtue of their commitments in other fora, beginning with the OAS itself. I am having a meeting this very day with the distinguished representatives of these countries, one from Central America and the others from the Caribbean, with a view to accelerating their adhesion to the Convention and their entry to the OPCW family, to which they naturally belong by virtue of their pacifist philosophy. I should like to extend my very special gratitude to the OAS and the Secretariat of this Committee which have, in a concrete demonstration of
inter-institutional cooperation, facilitated the meeting which I shall have with the representatives of these countries later.
As I said, the OPCW and the region have a history of real cooperation.
On the part of the Technical Secretariat, we have organised a series of meetings designed to increase knowledge of the Convention, its requirements and the concrete benefits which flow from membership, in particular in the area of cooperation and assistance in the legitimate uses of chemistry; these last elements are of undoubted importance for the developing countries in the Americas and the Caribbean. Worthy of mention are, inter alia, the Santa Lucia meeting of February 2000, the Regional Seminar on Universality held in Jamaica in 2001, the Regional Seminar on Universality and Implementation in Saint Maarten, the Dutch Antilles, in May of 2003 as well as a number of bilateral visits (Belize and Haiti) through which we have attempted to spread the message of the Convention and facilitate the process of adhesion for new members.
Mr Chairman, Friends,
Signing the Chemical Weapons Convention, as all the States of North and South America have done is a concrete and tangible contribution to international security.
However, it is also an action which furthers your own interests, because consolidation of the regime of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction benefits first and foremost the countries which are represented here.
From my own experience, I can tell you that the process of consolidation and coming closer to the international non-proliferation regime produced extremely positive results for my country. As my country’s delegate, it fell to me to take an active part in these processes, some of which we were able to complete in close contact and collaboration with Brazil, establishing a regime of accounting for, and control of, nuclear material, which is still looked to as an example in other regions of the world.
If I mention this example, which I know because I worked so hard to achieve it, it is because I am absolutely convinced that in the struggle against weapons of mass destruction our region, and all member countries of the OAS, have a real contribution to make.
We know that in many cases there are other priorities, and that in the smallest countries in particular bureaucratic structures are sometimes too small to respond to the multiple challenges and demands deriving from international commitments and treaties. However, the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW is, by means of different support and assistance programmes disposed and prepared to render this task simpler than it might appear.
Only a few days ago we organised in Addis Ababa, in cooperation with the African Union, a seminar on the Chemical Weapons Convention. Apart from the obvious differences between the two continents, there exists over there a similar preoccupation on the part of certain countries which, like in our region, have no difficulties of philosophy or principle with the Chemical Weapons Convention, but which simply have their hands full with other priorities of a different character.
However, understanding the reasons for a problem does not mean that we should view it with apathy or indifference. Therefore, we agreed with the Secretariat of the African Union to work together rapidly to fill the breach which still remains before all African countries are members.
I am sure that here, in the OAS, in a continent which pioneers the legal defence of peace, this task will be even easier and that we have a scheme for permanent and flexible cooperation with the General Secretariat. I formally invite this Commission, then, consistently with the terms of its mandate, to follow and support the efforts of the General Secretariat of the OAS and the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW to set up a scheme for cooperation between Organisations to facilitate the completion of our respective mandates.
The Declaration on Security in the Americas and the OPCW
In his kind invitation to come to this forum, the Chairman drew my attention to the approval which this document received and asked me to formulate such remarks and observations as I might deem relevant.
On behalf of the OPCW, I thank him for this opportunity, which I consider extremely opportune, since the struggle of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is conceivable only by fortifying the instruments which the international community has sanctioned for the purpose, and the organisations which have to see to their implementation.
For this reason I cannot praise highly enough the fact that, in that declaration, in the section on Commitments and Cooperation Measures, the countries of the OAS have stressed their commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation and to the full application of the treaties including of course the Chemical Weapons Convention, and have declared their purpose to make the Americas a region free of chemical and biological weapons. It is worth emphasising that the declaration contains the idea that the signatories shall resolutely support the “International Atomic Energy Agency (IAE), including the universal application of Agency’s safeguard system, and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and by establishing national standards and controls on exports of specialised materials, technology, and expertise that could contribute to the preparation, production, of use of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery”.
I do not think that anyone could have put it better and more clearly than the Mexico Declaration.
In these paragraphs of the Declaration, the countries of the Americas have specified an agenda and a working programme, and the OPCW is prepared to contribute to this task.
How?
I take the liberty of suggesting three axes of action:
1. Universality
The countries of the Americas have committed themselves to full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and to setting up a zone free of chemical and biological weapons.
This objective is within our reach.
As I said at the beginning of my statement, a mere handful of countries of the Americas still remain outside the framework of the OPCW – all countries which love peace, all as committed as the next country to the purposes of the Convention. Nothing, then, suggests that there might be major obstacles, as is the case in other regions, to them joining the Convention at an early date. This very day I will have a meeting with their representatives and we shall explore together the steps to take to make this ambitious objective a real contribution by the Americas to world security.
The Technical Secretariat of the OPCW places itself at the immediate disposition of these American and Caribbean countries to take care of their eventual requirements and to provide any advice or assistance which they may need in order to join the chemical disarmament regime.
2. National Application Measures.
After the First Conference to review the operation of the Convention, which was held in the Hague exactly one year ago, the States of the OPCW recommended that an action plan be drawn up in order to facilitate the adoption of the national provisions which are called for in the body of the Convention. The plan was drawn up and approved in record time and we already have a working group which has identified the areas in which our efforts have to be concentrated, principally the adoption of adequate internal legislation which would insert the provisions of the Convention into the internal legal system.
The Declaration on Hemispheric Security addresses this question in very precise terms, referring to national rules and export controls. In the OPCW, our first step here has been to set up the Network of Legal Experts, which embraces civil servants and experts from Latin American countries familiar with the tasks of the OPCW, and who collaborate, through our activity in support of national application, with the efforts of different countries.
This work is intensive, since it involves helping the countries of the region to set up their legal frameworks, which in many cases involves inter agency initiatives and consultation with legislative bodies. We have already organised a series of regional meetings of this network, the activity of which is often limited because of the limited resources it has to operate with. I believe that the OAS could play a role in supporting and developing the activity of this network of legal experts, the scope which could of course be broadened to other spheres of activity.
As for export control, the OPCW is able to give assistance to States Parties who request it when setting up measures of customs control. Again, this is an area of great complexity, in which national customs, frontier police and other institutions have responsibility which cannot be delegated. It is necessary, since the Chemical Weapons Convention establishes an export control system, and sets very clear limits with regard to transfers of certain substances to States which are not party to the Convention.
We have recently begun to enlarge this aspect of the Convention, also looking at problems relating to free zones and ports, the impact of which on commercial transactions involving chemicals covered by the Schedules of the Convention is both relevant and increasing. The first meeting of the experts was held in Barcelona last September, and the next will be held in Buenos Aires, also in September. This is another area in which, if deemed appropriate, the Commission and the OAS could make an extremely valuable contribution.
3. The struggle against international terrorism
The reference to the phenomenon of international terrorism is necessary within the framework of chemical weapons.
Conceived as an instrument designed to guide the conduct of States, the Chemical Weapons Convention, product of an epoch in which the phenomenon of terrorism had not yet acquired its current importance, makes no express reference to this topic. However, we see that recourse, actual or threatened, to attack with chemical weapons has become an extremely possible hypothesis. The chemical weapon has enormous potential for destruction and can be adapted to the model of violence against innocence unprotected civilians, which is typical of terrorist action.
I shall, Mr Chairman, once more seek the guidance of the Mexico Declaration, which, at paragraph 22, affirms that “terrorism poses a serious threat to security, the institutions, and democratic values of States and to the well being of our peoples.” The inter-American initiative here is at the forefront of international effort. The inter-American Convention against terrorism sets up an adequate framework and firm guidelines in this area, as does the inter-American Committee.
The OAS and the OPCW are united in this task in the Committee against terrorism established by the Security Council of the United Nations in Resolution 1373 (Counter Terrorism Committee).
Since the work of the CTC began, the OPCW has always been available and will continue to be so whenever called upon. The result of the last meeting in Washington, in October 2003, shows that there is still a long way to go and there is a real necessity to understand the activities and spheres of competence of the various Agencies which could derive enormous benefit from the experience and lessons learned by other Agencies in the system.
Within the scope of the OPCW, we understand that our contribution lies principally in constantly extending the scope of application of the Convention and, secondly, in facilitating the adoption of national application measures and the internal legislation which the Convention requires.
I have often said that the Chemical Weapons Convention is not a tool against terrorism, but at the same time I have always underlined that the strict application of its provisions, particularly at national level, creates an indispensable network of restraint, prevention and punishment. As an example, call to mind that the capture, trial and sentencing of terrorists accused of secretly developing prohibited substances in London and other cities were possible only by invoking the internal legislation which inscribed the Chemical Weapons Convention into the internal law.
Mr Chairman,
I am coming to the end of my presentation for this morning.
There are many themes which concern us and which are of reciprocal interest, and each one of them would deserve more detailed treatment.
I hope that, in my rapid treatment of them, I have been successful at least in stressing for us that, beyond shared values and beyond the elevated principles which motivate both Organisations, the OAS and the OCPW, each within its sphere of competence, have a common agenda before them.
I should like to see us redouble our common efforts and not to lose this opportunity to work together in favour of the security of our hemisphere, and through that security the security of the whole world, which has proscribed chemical weapons once and for all.
Many thanks.