

## **Conference of the States Parties**

Twenty-Ninth Session 25 – 29 November 2024

C-29/NAT.2 19 November 2024 ENGLISH and RUSSIAN only

### **RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

# REQUEST FOR CIRCULATION OF A DOCUMENT AT THE TWENTY-NINTH SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES

The Permanent Representation of the Russian Federation to the OPCW has requested that a note verbale addressed to the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW (dated 19 November 2024) be circulated as an official document of the Twenty-Ninth Session of the Conference of the States Parties.

Annex: Note Verbale from the Permanent Representation of the Russian Federation to

the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW Dated 19 November 2024

#### **Annex**

# NOTE VERBALE FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT OF THE OPCW DATED 19 NOVEMBER 2024

Unofficial translation



ПОСТОЯННОЕ ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВО РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ ПРИ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ПО ЗАПРЕЩЕНИЮ ХИМИЧЕСКОГО ОРУЖИЯ В ГААГЕ

PERMANENT REPRESENTATION
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
TO THE ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION
OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE HAGUE



The Permanent Representation of the Russian Federation to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) presents its compliments to the OPCW Technical Secretariat and has the honour to draw the attention of the OPCW Technical Secretariat, as well as the States Parties to the CWC, to the information materials on the use and preparation for use of chemical weapons by Ukraine against civilians, officials and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, enclosed hereby.

In view of the above, the Russian Federation addresses the OPCW Technical Secretariat to forward to the OPCW Executive Council its request to assist in obtaining clarification from Ukraine regarding the incidents mentioned in the documents enclosed.

The Permanent Representation of the Russian Federation to the OPCW requests the OPCW Technical Secretariat to distribute the following materials as two separate official national documents of the Russian Federation at the 29<sup>th</sup> Session of the Conference of the States Parties, with a copy of this Note Verbale, and make them available on the OPCW website and Catalyst platform:

Encl.: 36 pp.

TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT OF THE OPCW

The Hague

- On the use (Preparation for Use) of chemical weapons by Ukraine against civilians, officials and Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (Annex 1);
- On the continuing use of toxic chemicals by Ukrainian armed formations (Annex 2).

The Permanent Representation of the Russian Federation to the OPCW avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the OPCW Technical Secretariat assurances of its highest consideration.

The Hague, "19", November, 2024

Unofficial translation


ANNEX 2

#### RUSSIAN FEDERATION

## On the Continuing Use of Toxic Chemicals by Ukrainian Armed Formations

The Russian Federation continues to monitor and record the use of scheduled chemicals, riot control agents (RCAs) and chemicals not listed in the Schedules of the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter, the "CWC") by Ukrainian armed formations in the Special Military Operation (SMO) zone. In October 2023 and March 2024, detailed evidence was circulated to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Security Council and the United Nations (UN) General Assembly of the large-scale use of toxic chemicals by the Kiev regime in violation of Ukraine's obligations under the CWC, as well as provocations orchestrated by the Kiev regime and its Western patrons to accuse the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of similar acts.


The situation has not changed over the past months — Ukrainian armed formations continue to systematically use toxic chemicals, including those listed in Schedules 2 and 3 of the CWC, as well as RCAs against units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and civilians. More than 400 cases of use of non-lethal toxic chemicals by the Ukrainian side have been recorded during the SMO, most of them have been confirmed by relevant researches.



Some cases of use of toxic chemicals by Ukraine

The practice of dropping various kinds of improvised munitions and grenades filled with toxic substances and containers with chemicals (unknown in a number of cases) from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has continued unabated.







FPV drones equipped with containers full of toxic substances

Investigations into the use of toxic chemicals by the Ukrainian side are carried out by the Russian Federation in accordance with the CWC by means of field and fixed-site laboratories capable of reliably identifying the type of a chemical compound and often the producer country. In-depth sample analysis is carried out in the chemical analytical laboratory of the 27<sup>th</sup> Scientific Centre of the Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence Forces of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, an OPCW certified laboratory.







Russian mobile chemical control complexes

The Kiev regime uses a wide range of toxic chemicals, but the irritant chloropicrin and hydrogen cyanide, which are listed in Schedule 3 of the Annex on Chemicals to the CWC, the riot control agents chloroacetophenone (CN) and CS, as well as mixtures of chloropicrin and chloroacetophenone, remain the main agents whose use by Ukrainian militants has been recorded by the Russian side many times.

3

4

Chloropicrin was first used by Ukrainian neo-Nazis during the siege of the Odessa Trade Unions House on 2 May 2014 against those who opposed the armed coup d'état in Kiev sponsored by Western countries in February of the same year. Exposed to the heat of a fire set by neo-Nazis who threw Molotov cocktails at the protesters, chloropicrin decomposed to form phosgene, causing numerous casualties.

Cases of Ukrainian armed formations using munitions containing chloropicrin, chloroacetophenone and their mixtures are regularly recorded. Numerous chemical incidents involving chloropicrin have been observed in the areas of Donetsk, Gorlovka, Artemovsk (Donetsk People's Republic of the Russian Federation), Kremennaya (Lugansk People's Republic of the Russian Federation), Rabotino (Zaporozhye region of the Russian Federation), Graivoronsky district (Belgorod region of the Russian Federation), among others.

It is highly revealing that a number of the toxic substances and their formulations found in the possession of the Ukrainian militants were produced and in service only in the United States. This circumstance unambiguously points to the specific sponsors of the Ukrainian security services and the Kiev regime as a whole, which for a long time now have not disdained to participate directly in the terrorist activities of their wards.

US-made gas grenades containing CS have been used against Russian servicemen in the areas of Krasny Liman (Donetsk People's Republic of the Russian Federation) and Boguslavka (Kharkov region of the Russian Federation). Hand grenades with irritants labelled "Teren 6" have been repeatedly used by neo-Nazis when storming Russian positions on the territory of Donetsk People's Republic (particularly in the cities of Artemovsk and Mariupol, near Avdeevka settlement) and Lugansk People's Republic (Zaliman settlement), and a cache of these ammunition has also been found on the territory of the Donetsk People's Republic of the Russian Federation.





Teren 6 gas grenades found at captured positions of the armed forces of Ukraine in the Donetsk People's Republic of the Russian Federation in late 2023 – early 2024.

Cases in which Ukrainian armed formations launched artillery strikes against positions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation using 152 mm calibre munitions filled with toxic chemicals, mostly chloropicrin, were recorded. Such cases occurred, for example, in August 2023 near the settlement of Rabotino, Zaporozhye region of the Russian Federation, and in May 2024 in the Graivoronsky district, Belgorod region of the Russian Federation.

Ukraine uses NATO-type 155 mm calibre cluster smoke producing munitions filled with a metal chloride smoke mixture, as for example in the case of a chemical attack on 10 August 2024 in the town of Sudzha, Kursk region. The combustion products of this mixture have a strong irritant effect on the upper respiratory tract, and can also cause fatal poisoning due to the formation of toxic substances (zinc chloride, carbon monoxide and phosgene, included in the Schedule 3 on toxic chemicals (para.1) of the Annex on Chemicals to the CWC.

There is evidence that the military forces of the Kiev regime used adamsite and a chemical mixture based on sulfuric and nitric acid – toxic agents that affect upper respiratory tract, resulting in slow heart rate, increased blood pressure and sudden respiratory arrest – in April 2024 near the town of Kleshcheyevka (Donetsk People's Republic of the Russian Federation). Civilians in the Donetsk and

Lugansk People's Republics of the Russian Federation have repeatedly reported the use of chemical warfare agents against them by Ukrainian armed formations.

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During the SMO, about 20 cases were recorded of toxic chemicals used by the Kiev regime's special services to poison food products, which caused the death of at least 15 people. The facts of poisoning of officials of the administrations of new regions of the Russian Federation have been confirmed. Tests revealed the presence of bio-toxins, in particular, ricin, listed in Schedule 1 of the CWC Annex on Chemicals, BZ chemical warfare agent, listed in Schedule 2 of the CWC Annex on Chemicals, and phenolic compounds.

In August 2022 one of the leaders of a Russian region was hospitalised with signs of acute poisoning. As part of forensic chemical and toxicological examinations, the Laboratory of the 27<sup>th</sup> Scientific Centre of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation carried out the identification of toxic substances in blood samples of the affected person, as a result of which the presence of ricin was established in them.

Also in August 2022 the fact of poisoning of five servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation carrying out tasks in the zone of the SMO was registered. Three of them died as a result of poisoning. Tests conducted allowed to identify the presence of narcotic and psychotropic substances and an analogue of BZ in the blood of affected persons.

In February 2023 a poisoning of seven servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation after the meal was registered in the zone of the SMO. Tests revealed the presence of markers of hydrocyanic acid and cyanogen chloride included in Schedule 3 of the Annex on Chemicals of the CWC.

In September 2023, the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation foiled another attempt by Ukrainian special services to commit a terrorist act with the use of toxic chemicals in the city of Melitopol (Zaporozhye region of the Russian Federation). Test results revealed the analogue of the US-produced BZ

chemical warfare agent. The investigative authorities of the Russian Federation initiated criminal proceedings under the Article 205 "Act of Terrorism" and Article 355 "Development, Manufacture, Stockpiling, Acquisition or Sale of Weapons of Mass Destruction" of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation against three citizens of Ukraine, who were detained in preparation for the terrorist act and confessed.



Ampoules with toxic chemicals seized from a hideout during the detention of Ukrainian citizens

Also in February 2024, the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation in St. Petersburg uncovered and stopped the illegal activities of a clandestine cell of the Ukrainian paramilitary terrorist organization "Russian Volunteer Corps" (RVC) operating in the interests of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. Following the instructions of the RVC and Ukrainian military intelligence, members of the cell intended to poison food products to be sent as humanitarian aid to Russian servicemen and civilians located in the zone of the special military operation with a highly toxic chemical substance.

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8

At the end of March 2024, three types of smoke grenades with different content were used by Ukrainian armed formations in the area between the villages of Nikolaevka and Kurdyumovka (Donetsk People's Republic of the Russian Federation). Personnel of motorized rifle units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation were struck by smoke grenades dropped from UAVs, resulting in two fatalities. The personnel exposure (poisoning) became possible due to the huge amounts of aerosol getting into the bodies through respiratory system carrying chlorinated hydrocarbons, zinc chloride and CS.



Parts of the gas mask canister of a deceased Russian serviceman from which samples were taken on 30 March 2024

During reconnaissance and search operations in an abandoned building near the town of Yasinovataya (Donetsk People's Republic of the Russian Federation) on 1 April 2024, Russian servicemen uncovered a cache with weapons and ammunition, also containing two improvised devices consisting of seven vials with unknown substances (two pieces containing white powder, four pieces filled with a dark liquid, and one piece with a grey-coloured substance). The chemical analysis of the contents identified the white powder as phenol (a highly hazardous chemical), the dark liquid was identified as chloropicrin and the grey-coloured chemical was identified as C4 plastic explosive. The discovered devices were supposed to be used by Ukrainian militants as improvised chemical munitions.





Objects found on 1 April 2024 in a cache in the village of Yasinovataya, Donetsk People's Republic of the Russian Federation

Repeated use of hydrocyanic acid by Kiev regime militants against civilians and Russian military personnel has been documented.

In May 2004, for example, Ukrainian UAVs dropped munitions filled with this substance in the village of Semenovka which is 10 km from Avdeevka (Donetsk People's Republic of the Russian Federation). According to eyewitness testimonies, affected civilians demonstrated symptoms specific for hydrocyanic acid exposure: breathing difficulty, vomiting, a taste of bitter almond.

Another case of hydrocyanic acid use was registered in June 2024. After a UAV attack on the positions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation munition fragments were found in the Graivoronsky district (Belgorod region), and their laboratory tests confirmed the use of this toxic chemical.

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A network of chemical laboratories for production and filling of toxic chemicals was set by the Kiev regime. During engineer reconnaissance in one of settlements near Avdeevka (Donetsk People's Republic of the Russian Federation) a laboratory containing technological equipment for toxic chemicals production

was found in an industrial zone of a ruined building. In particular, industrial rotation steamer, filtration exhaust system, chemical reactors, carbonic acid cylinders, as well as racks with laboratory glassware, reagents and personal protection equipment for respiratory organs, including those of US manufacture, and skin - protective suit of Polish manufacture.



General view of laboratory in a ruined building



Rapid analysis sulfuric acid was detected in the canister and sodium cyanide was detected in the bulk container

In the course of analytical research conducted in laboratory conditions in accordance with the OPCW requirements, the presence of sodium cyanide, sulfuric acid and trace amounts of cyanide anions was identified in the samples. The presence of these chemicals unambiguously indicated that the laboratory found was engaged in the production of toxic substances having systemic toxic effect, in particular, sulfuric acid and cyanogen chloride.

Ukrainian prisoners of war witness in their testimonies the existence of such laboratories where production of toxic chemicals and filling them into munitions take place. There is evidence of the involvement of US specialists in their work, as well as participation of these structures in the production of kamikaze drones.

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The Kiev regime, with the assistance of its Western sponsors, has developed a new tactic for conducting combat operations using a "Special Chemical Belt". It involves the detonation of containers filled with hydrogen cyanide and ammonia during the advance of Russian troops. From September to October 2023, these chemicals were delivered to the areas of the towns of Kramatorsk (Donetsk People's Republic of the Russian Federation) and Kupyansk (Kharkov region of the Russian Federation) to be placed along motorways and at major transport interchanges.

According to the Kiev regime's plans, such tactics will significantly hamper the Russian Federation Armed Forces' offensive operations and give Kiev additional time to prepare defensive lines in Zaporozhye, Kharkov and Sumy regions.



"Special Chemical Belt" of the armed forces of Ukraine, indicating the proposed areas of placement of toxic chemicals for detonation

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Ukraine's requests for financial assistance, antidotes, gas masks and other personal protective equipment testify to its plans to use toxic substances. The request of the Ukrainian permanent mission to the European Union to the EU Military Staff for deliveries in 2024 includes: general military protective kits and gas masks – 283,000 items each; protective gloves and anti-chemical bags – 500,000 units of each item. The requested nomenclature also includes 150,000 antidote kits and 20,000 tests for the rapid detection of chemical warfare agents.

Gas masks  Standard military insulating protective gear MOPP (protective gear)  Protective gloves  Individual decontamination set  Antidote kits  Chemical warfare agent rapid detection tests		283,000 pcs. 283,000 pcs. 500,000 pcs. 500,000 pcs. 150,000 scts 20,000 pcs.							
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					Item  FSList protective suits .ight protective suits M53A1 gas masks	Quantity 40.3 ths. pcs. 15.3 ths. pcs. 55.6 ths. pcs.			Filter element
					Item  SList protective suits  Light protective suits  M53A1 gas masks  TDR respiratory protection kits	Quantity 40.3 ths. pcs.	M53A1 gas	M256A1 Chemical Agent	Filter element for C2FL or CA50
Item  SList protective suits .ight protective suits  M53A1 gus masks  FDR respiratory protection kits Filter elements for C2F1 or CA50 gas masks	Quantity 40.3 ths. pcs. 15.3 ths. pcs. 55.6 ths. pcs. 23.6 ths. pcs.	M53A1 gas	M256A1						
Item  ISList protective suits  Light protective suits  M53A1 gas masks  TDR respiratory protection kits  Filter elements for C2F1 or CA50 gas masks  M295 individual decontamination kits	Quantity 40.3 ths. pcs. 15.3 ths. pcs. 55.6 ths. pcs. 23.6 ths. pcs. 57.2 ths. pcs.	M53A1 gas	M256A1 Chemical Agent	for C2F1 or CA50					
Item  ISList protective suits Light protective suits M53A1 gus musks TDR respiratory protection kits Filter elements for C2F1 or CA50 gas masks M295 individual decontamination kits M256A1 Chemical Agent Detector Kit CHEMPRO100 and PROENGIN AP4C mPro100 hundhold	Quantity 40.3 ths. pcs. 15.3 ths. pcs. 55.6 ths. pcs. 23.6 ths. pcs. 57.2 ths. pcs.	M53A1 gas	M256A1 Chemical Agent	for C2F1 or CA50					
Item  ISList protective suits  Light protective suits  Light protective suits  ASA1 gas masks  CDR respiratory protection kits  Cilter elements for C2F1 or CA50 gas masks  M295 individual decontamination kits  M256A1 Chemical Agent Detector Kit  CHEMIPRO100 and PROENGIN AP4C mPro100 handhold detectors	Quantity 40.3 ths. pcs. 15.3 ths. pcs. 55.6 ths. pcs. 23.6 ths. pcs. 57.2 ths. pcs. 13.6 ths. pcs. 200 pcs.	M53A1 gas	M256A1 Chemical Agent	for C2F1 or CA50					
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	Quantity 40.3 ths. pcs. 15.3 ths. pcs. 55.6 ths. pcs. 23.6 ths. pcs. 23.6 ths. pcs. 23.6 ths. pcs. 200 pcs. 50 pcs.	M53A1 gas inasks	M256A1 Chemical Agent Detector Kit	for C2F1 or CA50 gas masks					

Projected supplies of personal protective equipment and antidotes to Ukraine in 2024

In 2023, NATO countries already supplied Ukraine with personal protective equipment (more than 55,000 kits), antidotes for organophosphorus agents

(600,000 ampoules), as well as drugs for detoxification of mustard gas, lewisite and hydrogen cyanide derivatives (750,000 vials).

In addition, a number of Western countries – Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States and others – generously sponsor, including through the OPCW, Ukraine's activities within the framework of so-called "protective" measures.

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The incidents cited as examples – in addition to the information already made public in October 2023 and in February 2024 – clearly demonstrate the numerous instances of the use of toxic chemicals and RCAs by the special services and militants of the Kiev regime as a method of warfare and for terrorist purposes, coupled with provocations at chemical industry facilities of Donbass. The systematic use of such toxic chemicals is a direct violation by Kiev of Articles I and II of the CWC. The Russian Federation has repeatedly pointed out that the false accusations made by Ukraine against the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation about the alleged use of toxic chemicals in the course of the SMO are nothing but an attempt – at the instigation of the United States and its Euro-Atlantic allies – to discredit the Russian Federation and to absolve Kiev of responsibility for repeated violations of its obligations under the Convention.

We hope that the States Parties to the CWC, having familiarised themselves with the materials on the real state of affairs in the SMO zone with regard to the CWC, will draw objective conclusions in this regard. There is an urgent need to contrast common sense with the irrepressible ambitions of the countries of the "collective West" to turn the OPCW, along with other specialised multilateral structures, into an instrument for achieving their geopolitical interests and imposing ambiguous cultural and civilizational values and double standards on the absolute majority of the world community.

The Russian Federation will continue to record and bring to the attention of the States Parties to the CWC data on the use by armed formations of the Kiev

14

regime of toxic chemicals against Russian servicemen and civilians and on the plans of Ukrainian militants to organise provocations against chemical facilities in the Donbass and other regions of the Russian Federation.