

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
STATEMENT ON AGENDA ITEM 6i
STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE XI
TO THE 107TH SESSION OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL**

The drafters of the Chemical Weapons Convention knew that guarding against the reemergence of chemical weapons and promoting **economic and technological development** were not mutually exclusive. And my country has, for years, been a champion of strengthening the economic and technological capacity of countries around the world.

Since 2022, as I mentioned in our National Statement, we have provided over \$140 million in capacity building support related to the Convention's implementation. For example, we are a proud supporter, both in spirit and financially, of the Africa Programme. The United States has engaged nearly 100 States Parties through critical partnerships. We are a major financial sponsor of the ChemTech Center. We are the first country to fund JPO positions for other countries, which we did specifically for underrepresented regions to promote geographic representation at the OPCW. We've sponsored Nigerian-led trainings on chemical security best practices for universities and industry, a chemical transportation security workshop in Algeria, an international working group to develop risk mitigation guidance for the physical security of chemical facilities in Kenya, a lab-twinning project in Morocco, and the list goes on.

This summer, we co-hosted a workshop in the Bahamas, with a particular focus on declarations and chemical and port security, given the Bahamas critical role in

maritime trade. Next year, the United States will hold two regional exercises, one for GRULAC and one for ECOWAS States Parties, which we are co-hosting with Nigeria. We are also planning capacity-building activities at the ChemTech Center.

All this to say, we put our money where our mouth is, as well as our time, our energy, and our focus. Promoting international economic and technological development is important to us.

At the same time, we are mindful of the critical task of preventing the reemergence and use of chemical weapons.

As such, our efforts to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons are firmly grounded in international law. This includes UN Security Council resolution 1540, a resolution that Russia and China both voted for, which obligates countries to institute **domestic legal-regulatory measures and controls** to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological **weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, and related materials**.

Labeling **internationally accepted export controls** as “unilateral coercive measures,” is, therefore, disingenuous.

Asking countries to choose between inhibiting the spread of chemical weapons and supporting economic development is a false premise. Countries can and should pursue both.

Using tools such as export controls **does not come at the expense** of technological and economic progress. In fact, it provides an essential pillar to promote growth while safeguarding the Convention.

The United States remains committed to continuing our capacity building efforts, while also working together with other countries from across the globe to support achieving our goal of a world free of chemical weapons.