



**Permanent Representation  
of Ukraine to the OPCW**

*English only*

*Subitem 9 d: Addressing the threat from chemical weapons use*

**Statement by H.E. Ambassador Oleksandr Karasevych  
during the 29th Conference of States Parties  
(November 25 - 29, 2024)**

**Mr. Chairperson,  
Mr. Director-General,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,  
Ambassadors and Delegates,**

The global framework for non-proliferation and disarmament, which strongly opposes the use of chemical weapons, has long been essential to maintaining international security and stability. However, this system is currently under significant strain, particularly due to the actions of certain states, notably Russia.

On behalf of my Government, I would like to express my gratitude to the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat for his readiness to coordinate the process in providing technical assistance to Ukraine, especially in the field of chemical safety and security in line with the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The ratification of the Pal Agreement has provided a solid foundation for cooperation between both sides. Notably, the third TAV was successfully held in Ukraine, focusing on equipping and training Ukrainian specialists to enhance their ability to respond to potential chemical threats. Ongoing discussions with the Secretariat are planned to coordinate future visits. Additionally, several training sessions were conducted at the Chem Tech Centre for Ukrainian experts designated by the National Authority, specifically on chemical weapons sampling for investigation purposes.

Ukraine has always been transparent in its cooperation with the OPCW. This is why the States Parties have been able to monitor the process of such cooperation with the Secretariat since the beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. As a result of this successful work, we received the report of the Organisation on the results of the Technical Assistance Visit of the Organisation to Ukraine, carried out under subparagraph 38 (e) of Article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The report emphasizes that the evidence provided by Ukraine, in particular a grenade marked RG-Vo and the corresponding soil samples, has been collected and provided to the OPCW representatives in compliance with the chain-of-custody and relevant procedures.

The evidence provided by Ukraine has been thoroughly analyzed by two OPCW designated laboratories, independent from one another.

The document confirms that the evidence provided by Ukraine contains chemical elements that are related to riot control agents, which, as Ukrainian investigation has repeatedly stated, are regularly used by the Russian Federation as a method of warfare against the Security and Defense Forces of Ukraine.

The OPCW report has clearly confirmed that both the grenade taken from the trench and the soil sample taken next to it contained CS substance, which is a riot control agent.

The Ukrainian side has consistently stated that the Russian Federation systematically uses hazardous chemical substances against Ukraine, in particular tear gas grenades of RG-Vo type.

Thus, in the period from February 2023 to November 2024, there have been recorded and documented more than 4 950 cases of use by the Russian Federation of munition containing hazardous chemicals, including 2-chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS), chloroacetophenone (CN), as well as chloropicrin. More detailed information is provided in the addendum.

Riot control agents (RCAs) on the battlefield create deadly conditions, forcing militaries to either endure physical disability or risk their lives by leaving their trenches where they can be shot down. This is a direct violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which prohibits the use of such agents in warfare due to their inhumane effects.

As confirmed by the Security Service of Ukraine, the K-51, RGR and RG-Vo aerosol grenades, which contain substances identified as riot control agents, were not and are not in service with the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard of Ukraine, or the Security Service of Ukraine. The specified type of special means was not produced on the territory of Ukraine. They are produced at Russian enterprises, in particular at the Russian Research Center Applied Chemistry and the Scientific Research Institute of Applied Chemistry.

Such actions by the Russian Federation constitute a blatant violation of paragraph 5 of Article 1 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction.

The Russian Federation has repeatedly used chemical weapons in the territory of sovereign states, and therefore has no moral right to be a member of the governing bodies of relevant international organisations, particularly the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Russia's use of prohibited chemicals on the battlefield is yet another example of Russia's chronic disregard for norms of international law. The Russian regime poses a threat to the entire international community, and all efforts must be united to achieve a comprehensive, just, and sustainable peace.

Ukraine has sufficient evidence of Russia's violations of the norms of the Convention and will actively engage the international community in decisive action, including through the independent and expert work of the OPCW with the support of States Parties.

We recall that at the Summit of the Future on 22 September 2024, world leaders adopted a Pact for the Future which inter alia decided to pursue a world free from chemical weapons and to ensure that those responsible for any use of these weapons are identified and held accountable.

Ukraine reaffirms that, whenever a chemical weapons use occurs on the territory of a State Party, those who were the perpetrators, organisers, sponsors or otherwise involved should be

identified, and underscores the added value of the Secretariat conducting an independent investigation of an alleged use of chemical weapons with a view to facilitating universal attribution of all chemical weapons attacks.

A world free of chemical weapons is our common goal. This is only achievable with our unwavering commitment to fully implement the Convention. While remaining a strong supporter of the OPCW and the Convention, Ukraine will continue to fulfill its international obligations.

Let me express my appreciation for all the statements of support from OPCW Member States about the situation in Ukraine. We are very grateful for the strong international support.

I ask that this statement be designated an official document of this session of the Conference of the States Parties and posted on both the external server and the public website.

**Thank you for your attention.**

### **Facts on the Use of Chemical Weapons by the Russian Federation, Including Chloropicrin and Other Toxic Chemical Agents, in Violation of the CWC**

Under the procedural guidance of prosecutors from the Department for Countering Crimes Committed in Armed Conflict of the Office of the Prosecutor General, the Main Investigation Department of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) is conducting pre-trial investigations in several criminal cases related to the use of chemical weapons by the Russian Federation's armed forces against Ukraine.

As of November 2024, information has been gathered regarding 4,950 instances of potential use of chemical agents by the Russian Federation's armed forces against Ukraine's Defense Forces. At the same time, unverified information includes all reports regarding the use of unknown substances.

To date, considering the objective circumstances, including the conditions of the ongoing hostilities where chemical substances are being used, 72 cases of the application of such substances have been confirmed.

During the criminal proceedings, among other facts, the following instances of the use of chemical weapons by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AF RF) are being investigated:

1. On March 10, 2023, on the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces between the settlements of Severne and Vodyane in Donetsk region, an aerosol grenade K-51 (chemical substance CS - 2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile) was used against the military personnel of the 501st Separate Marine Battalion of the 36th Separate Marine Brigade, resulting in 8 soldiers being affected, one of whom died.
2. On February 8, 2023, an aerosol grenade K-51 was dropped on the position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near the settlement of Marinka, Donetsk region.
3. On March 29, 2023, and also at the end of March 2023, unidentified operators of UAVs from the 88th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Federation's Eastern Military District, as well as from the 123rd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, used chemical weapons – an aerosol grenade K-51 – against the military personnel of the National Guard of Ukraine near the settlement of Spirne, Donetsk region.
4. On December 20, 2023, during offensive actions, the Russian Federation Armed Forces used chemical weapons – aerosol grenades K-51 and RG-Vos – against the military personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces at positions near the settlement of Spirne, Donetsk region.

The investigator is also verifying the fact of the use of chemical weapons by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on January 17, 2024, between 16:00 and 19:00, against the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the forest belt along the P-07 road between the settlements of Tabavka and Krokhmalsne, using grenades resembling RG-Vos.

Regarding the number of injured and deceased individuals in Ukraine due to the use of chemical weapons by the aggressor state:

During the pre-trial investigation, 94 military personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were identified as witnesses to the use of chemical substances by the Russian Federation Armed Forces or as victims of such use.

A total of 26 individuals were interrogated as witnesses, and 16 individuals were recognized as victims. Approximately 57 delivery devices for chemical substances, their fragments, and samples of clothing, water, and soil with traces of the applied substance were seized.

Testimonies of the victims, medical workers, and other witnesses; clinical descriptions of symptoms and the condition of the victims:

According to the information obtained from the victims, the general symptoms as a result of the use of chemical substances included damage to mucous membranes and respiratory tract, as well as esophageal damage (due to high concentrations of the substance and its ingestion). These symptoms manifested as a burning sensation in the throat, coughing, suffocation, eye redness, tearing, and nausea.

In some cases, information was obtained regarding the appearance of prolonged fatigue and discomfort in the lungs long after the exposure.

Prosecutors of the Office of the Prosecutor General, exercising procedural powers in accordance with the requirements of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, continue their diligent work in collecting evidence in these criminal proceedings, which may indicate the systemic nature of the gross violation of the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) by the Russian Federation.

### **Reports by the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine**

Coverage of Facts Regarding the Use of Chemical Weapons by the Russian Federation, including Chloropicrin and Other Toxic Chemical Agents, in Violation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, Use, and Destruction of Chemical Weapons (CWC).

As of October 25, 2024, the units of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine have recorded 112 instances of the use of dangerous chemical substances by the Russian Federation's armed forces against the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine units (1 case in 2022, 8 cases in 2023, and 103 cases in 2024).

These chemical substances were used against the State Border Guard Service units, located both on the territory of Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

- Donetsk Oblast – 73 cases
- Sumy Oblast – 5 cases
- Kharkiv Oblast – 1 case
- Kherson Oblast – 11 cases
- Luhansk Oblast – 18 cases
- Kursk Oblast (RF) – 4 cases

In most cases, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were used to deliver these chemical substances.

- UAVs – 103 cases
- Artillery use – 8 cases
- Infantry assault operations – 1 case

The chemical substances were primarily used during daylight hours and at dusk.

- At night – 8 cases
- In the morning – 19 cases
- During the day – 23 cases
- In the evening – 62 cases

As a result of the use of dangerous chemical substances by the Russian Federation's armed forces against the units of the State Border Guard Service, 57 servicemen were injured. In most cases, evacuation was carried out to designated stabilization points or the nearest medical institutions.

Typical symptoms in the injured individuals include inhalation poisoning by an unknown chemical substance, "biologically active irritant," presenting as irritation of the mucous membranes of the eyes and mouth, rhino-pharyngotracheitis, bronchial hyperactivity syndrome, myositis of the calf muscles, vertebrogenic tarocolumbar pain, and poisoning by toxic chemical agents.

## Reports by the National Police of Ukraine (National Guard of Ukraine) on the use of RCAs by Russia in Ukraine

The National Guard of Ukraine (NGU) systematically records the use of chemical weapons by the Russian Federation against NGU units along the entire front line of combat operations, with a particular concentration of chemical weapon use observed in the Zaporizhzhia direction.

From January 1, 2023, to October 29, 2024, a total of 1,329 cases of the use of the aforementioned type of weapon have been documented. The primary weapons used are Soviet-made K-51 gas hand grenades with remote activation, RG-R hand grenades with an irritant effect, filled with the toxic substance CS (2-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile) or chloropicrin, as well as RG-V chemical hand grenades filled with the toxic substance CN (chloroacetophenone), which are deployed via unmanned aerial vehicles.

Since 2022, a total of 260 NGU servicemen have sought medical assistance in the combat zone due to symptoms of chemical exposure. No fatalities have been recorded.

According to medical personnel providing first aid to the wounded and affected, the main symptoms of chemical exposure include shortness of breath, coughing, and dizziness. Given that qualified medical care for servicemen exhibiting signs of chemical poisoning has been provided by the nearest healthcare facilities, regardless of ownership, more time is needed for a more accurate description of the clinical symptoms and a detailed analysis.

No	Date	Type	Q-ty	Method of delivery	Region
<b>2023</b>					
1	March	K-51	10	UAV	Luhansk
2	April	K-51	10	UAV	Luhansk
3	May	K-51	12	UAV	Luhansk
4	July	unknown	10	Artillery	Zaporizhzhia
5	September	K-51	12	UAV	Donetsk
6	October	K-51	13	UAV	Donetsk
7	November	unknown	1	UAV	Zaporizhzhia
8	December	K-51	24	UAV	Zaporizhzhia
		K-51	20	UAV	Donetsk
		unknown	1	UAV	Donetsk
<b>Total, 2023</b>			<b>113</b>		
<b>2024</b>					
1	January	K-51	34+1	UAV	Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk

2	February	K-51, unknown, RG-VO, K-51	11+1+3+2	UAV	Zaporizhzhia, Zaporizhzhia Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia
3	March	K-51, K-51, RG-VO, K-51	135+10+1+3	UAV	Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, Luhansk, Donetsk
4	April	K-51, unknown, unknown, RG-VO	49+2+46+26	UAV	Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Zaporizhzhia
5	May	K-51, RG-VO, unknown	8+246+194	UAV	Zaporizhzhia, Zaporizhzhia, Zaporizhzhia
6	June	K-51, RG-VO, unknown	2+76+116	UAV	Zaporizhzhia, Zaporizhzhia, Zaporizhzhia
7	July	unknown	4	UAV	Zaporizhzhia
8	August	K-51, RG-VO	85+1	UAV	Zaporizhzhia Zaporizhzhia
9	September	RG-VO, unknown	18+62	UAV	Zaporizhzhia
10	October	RG-VO, unknown	19+49	UAV	Zaporizhzhia
<b>Total, 2024</b>			<b>1329</b>		