

**STATEMENT  
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HEAD OF THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION,  
DEPUTY MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE  
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AT THE TWENTY-NINTH SESSION  
OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES  
TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION**

(The Hague, 25-29 November 2024)

Mr. Chairperson,

Mr. Director-General,

Distinguished delegates,

First of all, on behalf of the Russian Federation, we would like to congratulate the distinguished Ambassador Almir Šahović on his election as Chairperson of the Conference of the States Parties (CSP) to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and assure him of our willingness to engage constructively in order to make the work of the twenty-ninth session of the Conference as effective as possible.

Also we would like to gratitude the Chairperson of the CSP-28 to the CWC the distinguished Ambassador Suldjuk Tarar for successful work.

The Russian Federation, in the process of elaboration and implementation of the CWC, has always focused on the need to strengthen it and to achieve full universality of this most important international treaty, and has taken measures to engage new states to the CWC.

The decision of Syria, upon recommendation of the Russian Federation, to become a party to the CWC was most significant in this regard. This allowed to reduce the highest tension in the Middle East region and eliminate the proliferation of this type of weapons of mass destruction.

It was for such efforts that the OPCW received the Noble Peace Prize.

The objectives of the Convention cannot be fulfilled unless all states that remain outside its legal framework accede to it. Indeed, the Convention's universality and effective implementation of the verification regime can reliably protect against the use of chemical weapons. However, universality is not only about ensuring broad participation, but also about behaving responsibly, interpreting the provisions of the Convention in a unified manner and avoiding abusing them.

Against the backdrop of the deteriorating international situation and growing negative trends in international security, Western countries are seeking to subordinate multilateral platforms to their geopolitical agendas. The OPCW has not become an exception.

Despite its landmark achievement – destruction of all declared chemical weapons stockpiles – the Organization has fallen on hard times. Instead of joining efforts to universalize the CWC, prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons, develop "peaceful chemistry", counter the threat of chemical terrorism and adapt the OPCW to new challenges, a number of states are using the Hague platform to make political statements and propaganda actions and are trying to reshape the Organization in order to achieve their selfish goals.

This occurs in the context of the increasing use of toxic chemicals and riot control agents (RCAs) in military conflicts and the active preparation of terrorist groups to use such agents for provocations and terrorist attacks. Ukrainian armed formations continue to regularly use toxic chemicals and RCAs against Russian servicemen and civilians in the zone of the special military operation. There is information that ISIS, together with Western and Ukrainian special services and with the participation of the notorious *White Helmets* organization, is preparing chemical provocations with the use of toxic chemicals. In mid-October, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

(UNIFIL) announced that UN peacekeepers had been exposed to toxic chemicals.

All these incidents involve those very states that view the OPCW as a tool for realizing their interests. Their efforts have resulted in the excessive politicization of the OPCW's activities, the absence of real dialogue or search for compromise, and the imposition of decisions inconsistent with the CWC and the OPCW's mandate through voting.

The interference in the election process to prevent reelection of the Russian Federation to the Executive Council is one of the most glaring examples of this. Russia has the most significant chemical industry among the countries of the Eastern European Group (EEG). Russia is also the undisputed leader in terms of both the number of declared facilities and the number of facilities inspectable by the OPCW Technical Secretariat. I address to all States Parties: we must understand that dialogue and cooperation are key actions on complete prohibition and non-proliferation of chemical weapons. The absence of dialogue weakens our efforts to ensure global security. Campaign to prevent re-election of Russia to the Executive Council has created barriers to open discussion and information sharing and only diminishes the role and influence of the OPCW as the most effective tool to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

With this approach, we will never succeed in bringing states that are not yet members of the OPCW into the CWC. The example of Syria clearly demonstrates that voluntary admission to the OPCW is punished by violent reprisals from the Western countries.

In spite all our differences; we must seek the ways to restore confidence between each other and to continue the work to achieve our common goal. I encourage all of us to engage in constructive dialogue to make the OPCW stronger than ever before.

Another striking example is conferring the function of identifying the perpetrators on the OPCW Technical Secretariat and imposing on the OPCW an "understanding" regarding the aerosolized use of central nervous system-acting chemicals for law enforcement purposes. This is nothing less than a politicized expansion of the Technical Secretariat's mandate and the scope of the CWC, which circumvents the provisions of its Article XV clearly stipulating that new decisions on matters of substance should be taken by absolute consensus.

The decision to impose sanctions measures against Damascus under Article XII of the Convention due to Syria's alleged violation of its obligations, which was forced through last year at the 28<sup>th</sup> session of the CSP, contradicts international law and the UN Charter and cannot be considered legitimate, since the Technical Secretariat cannot be vested with the functions of the sanctions committees of the UN Security Council.

A number of delegations have argued unequivocally that the Conference has the right to take **any** decision it wishes. I would like to note in this regard that this in no way implies the right to go beyond the provisions of the CWC and take actions that are contrary to the UN Charter, to encroach on the exclusive prerogatives and the mandate of the UN Security Council, or duplicate its sanctioning powers.

The countries of the collective West behave as if neither the rules of procedure nor the Convention itself are binding on them, because they are sure that any decision they need can be imposed by voting. And if they doubt this, they simply change the rules at their discretion. A vivid example is the invented formula for electing members of the OPCW Executive Council. Not only does it violate the rules of procedure and is non-existent in other international organizations, but it also contradicts the principles of democracy and freedom of choice.

The world's minority countries have adopted the practice of using the OPCW platform to make unsubstantiated accusations. However, as soon as it comes to following the norms stipulated in the Convention, they avoid professional dialogue in every possible way, resorting instead to the language of slogans and ultimatums.

In this context, we fully share the concerns of the countries representing the world's majority regarding the attempts to accuse the States Parties to the CWC of using chemical weapons or failing to comply with the provisions of the Convention on the basis of doubtful information. This leads to undermining the authority of our Organization and raises doubts as to the level of its expertise, as well as the impartiality and objectivity of its approaches. Meanwhile, behind the smokescreen of indiscriminate accusations of alleged violations of the CWC, the collective West is trying to settle scores with the countries it deems undesirable. If you have any doubts about this, just take a closer look at the list of states against which allegations are being made.

We have already informed the States Parties to the CWC about the involvement of the USA and its Euro-Atlantic allies in the supply of toxic scheduled and unscheduled chemicals and their means of delivery to Ukraine. We have to note that such supplies are still ongoing. The Kiev regime continues to systematically use toxic chemicals and RCAs against the armed forces of the Russian Federation, the civilian population and the leadership of the Russian regions located in the zone of the special military operation. The documented evidence, including the results of the analysis of samples taken by Russian servicemen on the battle contact line, is being submitted to the OPCW Technical Secretariat for distribution among the States Parties to the CWC, as well as to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. The tests are conducted at the specialized chemical analytical laboratory of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in strict compliance with the requirements of the CWC. The latest compilation of such

materials was distributed on the eve of the current session. This is a direct evidence of Kiev's violations of its obligations under the CWC. We ask the Technical Secretariat and the States Parties to the Convention to treat this information with the utmost responsibility. The perpetrators of these crimes ought to be punished.

We are also particularly concerned by the information coming from the field about the preparation of large-scale provocations in Ukraine involving the use of toxic chemicals. However, despite the fact that we have indisputable evidence of the involvement of the Kiev regime and its Western sponsors in chemical provocations, it is the Russian Federation that the USA and its allies are persistently seeking to accuse of violating the provisions of the Convention, trying to impose this perverted vision on many other States Parties to the CWC. An example of this is another provocative information by Ukraine distributed through the Note of the OPCW Technical Secretariat (S/2338/2024 dated 18 November 2024). The Russian Federation is reviewing this information and will report the results in due course.

Mr. Chairperson,

The Syrian Arab Republic continues to be subjected to unprecedented pressure from Western countries in The Hague.

Despite all difficulties, the Syrian authorities have consistently and openly engaged with the OPCW within the framework of the mechanisms set out in the Convention and the voluntary additional commitments under UN Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013). The Syrian authorities have demonstrated the highest degree of transparency with regard to providing documentation and additionally declaring on past activities in order to clarify the existing ambiguities with respect to Damascus' initial declaration under the CWC. Yet, despite this, Damascus is facing more and more far-fetched accusations. No matter what Syria does, no matter what steps of goodwill it takes, this is never enough, according to the West.

The Russian Federation reaffirms its position of principle not to recognize the legitimacy of attribution mechanisms at the OPCW. The UN Security Council has never delegated its authority under Article VII of the UN Charter either to the OPCW, or, even less so, to its Technical Secretariat. Thus, the activities of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) are beyond the legal framework of the OPCW and violate the UN Charter. Neither the biased falsified reports of the IIT, nor the politically motivated non-consensual decisions of the OPCW's governing bodies based on them are acceptable for the Russian Federation.

I would like to remind everyone present how, with the help of the Syrian opposition entities, in April 2018 information emerged that the Syrian Government Forces had allegedly conducted a strike with the use of chemical weapons on territories held by militants in the town of Douma. In social networks a video made by terrorist affiliated NGO “White Helmets” was circulated that showed first aid being delivered to local civilians allegedly affected by a chemical attack.

Nevertheless, already on 26 April 2018, in the OPCW Headquarters the supposed “victims” of this staged event already were testifying that they were only actors in a pseudo report of “White Helmets”. However, this did not hinder the United States, United Kingdom and France from conducting a missile strike on the SSRC in Barzeh and other Syrian military and civil facilities without even waiting for the results of the investigation of the Fact-Finding Mission in Syria.

We categorically object to the transfer by the OPCW Technical Secretariat of confidential information to the so-called International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation in the Syrian Arab Republic (IIIM). We are convinced that the Secretariat exceeded its authority when it concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with this odious structure on itself, in violation of Article VIII, paragraph 34 of the Convention.

It is a matter of serious concern that the United States and its allies are once again making groundless accusations of violations of the CWC against other States Parties to the CWC, in particular Iran. Such accusations sound particularly cynical against the background of the fact that the accusers themselves, as mentioned earlier, are supplying Ukraine with toxic chemicals and their means of delivery and are involved in the "chemical" activity of terrorist groups in Syria. We call on these States to cease such illegal activities, refrain from making unsubstantiated accusations against responsible States Parties to the CWC and abandon the destructive course of politicizing the work of the OPCW, which leads to the imminent degradation of this specialized international structure.

Following the completion of the destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles, we believe that one of the Organization's key tasks should be the elimination of the abandoned chemical weapons in various parts of the world. We look forward to Japan accelerating the pace of its work to detect and eliminate the chemical weapons abandoned by the Kwantung Army on the Chinese territory.

Mr. Chairperson,

Regrettably, the prevailing politicized agenda has actually overshadowed one of the OPCW's priorities, namely the implementation of Article XI of the CWC. The Convention clearly sets out the parameters for assisting the economic and technological development of the States Parties to the CWC in the use of chemicals for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, as well as assisting developing countries in building specialized industrial capabilities.

In this context, we would like to reiterate the obvious truth that full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of all provisions of the Convention, including the economic and technological development of its States Parties, is of the utmost importance for the future success of



the Organization. The Russian Federation is taking concrete steps aimed at implementing Article XI of the CWC and is ready to provide maximum assistance, within its framework, to all interested States Parties.

We draw attention to the fact that the United States and its allies continue to impose illegal unilateral sanctions in the field of chemical industry against states that they deem undesirable, referring in particular to the provisions of multilateral export control regimes. Such actions are a violation of Article XI of the Convention. We call on Western countries to refrain from abusing export control mechanisms for their own political purposes.

Mr. Chairperson,

The Convention's mandate provides for the implementation of control measures to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons. The States Parties to the CWC are united in their understanding of the need to regularly improve the verification regime for chemical industry facilities and to adapt it to the current realities of scientific and technological development. In doing this, it is important to maintain a reasonable balance between verification efficiency and minimization of the verification burden on chemical industry enterprises and avoid creating obstacles to international cooperation in the field of "peaceful chemistry".

It is important to take measures to strengthen the chemical weapons non-proliferation regime by ensuring that decisions adopted by the OPCW on the procedure for the export/import of scheduled chemicals are implemented and that the data of the States Parties to the CWC are included in their annual declarations. Thus, for 2023, the report of the OPCW Technical Secretariat notes that 71 per cent of declarations have discrepancies, which amounts to 592 cases. The Russian Federation have repeatedly emphasized that discrepancies in declarations under Article VI of the Convention create preconditions for the uncontrolled proliferation of scheduled chemicals in violation of the provisions of this international treaty. We are alarmed by

the information that terrorists have the necessary capacity to use industrial chemicals for military purposes and even produce full-fledged chemical warfare agents.

Despite the fact that the Convention's counter-terrorism potential is strictly limited, it is important to pay close attention to this very dangerous phenomenon. This can be done through active participation at the expert level in the development of a separate legally binding instrument, like International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Chemical and Biological Terrorism that the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China proposed to elaborate back in 2016.

We support the statement by the Non-Aligned Movement and China, in particular, with regard to comprehensive and non-discriminatory implementation of Article XI.

We call on the States Parties to work together to take all necessary measures to bring the work of the Organization back to its mandated technical framework, ensuring constructive and pragmatic interaction on the basis of consensus, mutual respect and taking into account the interests of all its Member States. We need to realize that the CWC is not a tool in the hands of a certain limited number of states, but our common heritage

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.